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PANAMA

SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER ARRIVES IN PANAMA

[Editorial Report C] Panama City Radio Libertad in Spanish at 1659 GMT on 7 Feb reports the arrival of Secretary of State Kissinger at Panama's Tocumen Airport. The secretary is greeted by Panamanian Chief of Government Omar Torrijos, and the two men immediately depart by limousine for Panama City.

Panama City Television Service in Spanish carried a live relay of Dr Kissinger's arrival in Panama, ending its relay at 1710 GMT with the departure of the two men by limousine for Panama City.

TEXT OF PANAMANIAN-U.S JOINT STATEMENT

Panama City Radio and Television Service in Spanish 1915 GMT 7 Feb 74 C

[Agreement read paragraph by paragraph in English and Spanish by official spokesmen of the delegations--live]

[Text] Joint statement by the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, secretary of state of the United States of America, and His Excellency Juan Antonio Tack, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Panama, on February 7, 1974 in Panama City.

The United States of America and the Republic of Panama have been engaged in negotiations to conclude an entirely new treaty **respecting** the Panama Canal, negotiations which were made possible by the joint declaration between the two countries of April 3, 1964, agreed to under the offices of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States acting provisionally as the organ of consultation.

The new treaty will abrogate the treaty existing since 1903 and its subsequent amendments, establishing the necessary conditions for a modern relationship between the two countries based on the most profound mutual respect.

Since the end of last November, the authorized representatives of the two governments have **been holding important conversations which have permitted** an agreement to be reached on a set of fundamental principles that will serve to guide the negotiators in the effort to conclude a just and equitable treaty eliminating once and for all the causes of conflict between the two countries.

The principles to which we have agreed, on behalf of our respective governments, are as follows:

1. The treaty of 1903 and its amendments will be abrogated by the conclusion of an entirely new interoceanic canal treaty.
2. The concept of perpetuity will be eliminated. The new treaty concerning the locks canal shall have a fixed termination date.
3. Termination of U.S. jurisdiction over Panamanian territory shall take place promptly in accordance with terms specified in the treaty.
4. The Panamanian territory in which the canal is situated shall be returned to the **jurisdiction** of the Republic of Panama. The Republic of Panama, in its capacity as territorial sovereign, shall grant to the United States of America, for the duration of the new interoceanic canal treaty and in accordance with what **that** treaty states, the right to use the lands, waters and air space which may be considered necessary for the operation, ma

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5. The Republic of Panama shall have a just and equitable share of the benefits derived from the operation of the canal in its territory. It is recognized that the geographic position of its territory constitutes the principal resource of the Republic of Panama.
6. The Republic of Panama shall participate in the administration of the canal in accordance with the procedure to be agreed upon in the treaty. The treaty shall also provide that Panama will assume total responsibility for the operation of the canal. Upon the termination of the treaty the Republic of Panama shall grant to the United States of America the rights necessary to regulate the transit of ships through the canal and operate, maintain, protect and defend the canal and to undertake any other specific activity related to those ends as may be agreed upon in the treaty.
7. The Republic of Panama shall participate with the United States of America in the protection and defense of the canal in accordance with what is agreed upon in the new treaty.
8. The United States of America and the Republic of Panama, recognizing the important services rendered by the interoceanic Panama Canal to international maritime traffic, and bearing in mind the possibility that the present canal could become inadequate for said traffic, shall agree bilaterally on revisions for new projects which will enlarge canal capacity. Such provisions will be incorporated in the new treaty in accord with the concepts established in Principle 2.

The accord, whose text you have just heard, will now be signed by His Excellency Dr Henry Kissinger, U.S. secretary of state, and His Excellency Juan Antonio Tack, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Panama.

TACK SPEECH AFTER SIGNING U.S.-PANAMA AGREEMENT

Panama Domestic Radio and Television Service in Spanish 1927 GMT 7 Feb 74 C

[Speech by Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack at ceremony marking signing of joint statement of principles on canal negotiations, delivered at the Legislative Palace in Panama City--live]

[Text] Your Excellency, Mr vice president of the republic, Arturo Sucre; Your Excellency, Mr secretary of state of the United States, Dr Henry Kissinger; ladies and gentlemen: You, Mr Secretary of State, have had the courtesy to come to Panamanian territory to sign the agreement on basic principles which will henceforth guide the negotiations for a new canal treaty between Panama and the United States of America.

As far as we are concerned, we continue to face our people and the world in a frank and open manner; we have nothing to hide. Here today is the initial result of our efforts, directed toward the solution of the problems between our two countries which stem from the existence of the interoceanic canal in Panamanian territory, and our complete responsibility at this time is to the Panamanian people, who for 70 years have been demanding justice and the legitimate restoration of their sovereign rights. The correct way to make Panama a fully sovereign and independent country must begin with annulment of the 1903 treaty and the return of the Panamanian territory known as the Canal Zone to the full jurisdiction of the Republic of Panama. And that path is clearly established in the agreement which we sign today.

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We, Mr Secretary of State, recognize your profound vision of the course of history, your thorough understanding of the aspirations, objectives and fully justified demands of the Panamanian nation, and your energy, decisiveness and will to find just and adequate solutions to real problems. We hope that our negotiations and the untiring efforts of our negotiators will finally lead to a new just and fair treaty desired by the Panamanian people, which will forever eliminate the causes of conflict that have on various occasions clouded relations between Panama and the United States of America.

Thus, Mr Secretary of State, we will then be able to build a new type of relations between the governments and peoples of Panama and the United States, which will be frank, cordial and friendly, upon the solid basis of the deepest mutual respect for the national sovereignty, the national identity and the dignity and patriotic pride of each of our two countries. Thank you very much.

Tack Press Conference

Panama City Domestic Radio and Television Service in Spanish 0117 GMT 8 Feb 74 C

[News conference in Panama City featuring Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack, Panamanian Ambassador to the United States Nicolas Gonzalez Revilla, negotiator Carlos Guevara Lopez and Negotiator Diogenes de la Rosa--live]

[Text] [Tack]: Distinguished members of the national and international press present here; Fellow workers; Colleagues of the national government; Citizens:

Panama today has experienced an historic moment of great importance. We are aware of the importance of the event that took place today with the arrival in our country of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Faced with our responsibility to the citizens and the Panamanian people in whose name our government has acted and will continue to act, we have decided to come before you this very day, immediately after the ceremony marking the signing of the agreement on basic principles regarding negotiations on a new canal treaty. This way our country will have the clearest and most precise idea of what we have done today.

The national government has asked me above all to report to our people our deepest gratitude for their exemplary civil behavior which was clearly demonstrated throughout the day. This is proof of the high level of maturity, responsibility and civil consciousness that our country has reached. After all, the truth is that 70 years ago our small country through its own efforts was born into independent life. It was born with the will to be truly independent--a sovereign and independent nation.

This was the path, the option that our people chose and which was predetermined by history. At that moment--at the moment when we were being born to independent life with big hopes--at that time Panama took the blow of an unjust treaty, a troublesome and undignified treaty, and the struggle began--a struggle that has been developing in a permanent, constant and strong manner for 70 years and which is reaching a culmination point at which we will have to find a definite solution. It is within this context that the agreement of principles that Secretary of State Kissinger and I, as foreign minister in the name of the national government, have signed, will take its force, its significance and its importance.

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We are here before you, before public opinion, before our people in an open and frank manner. As I said this evening, we have nothing to hide and we are here so that you may ask whatever questions you may have in mind.

[CRITICA Reporter Rafael (Peralta) Ortega]: When will the negotiations begin? Where will the main discussions be held, in Panama or in the United States? And in your opinion, as a well-versed person in foreign affairs, how long do you think the signing of a new treaty will take?

[Tack]: Your question lets me clear up a point that has caused confusion. It is not a matter of negotiations beginning now or of their being reopened. I would like to make this very clear. I have said on previous occasions--and it has been reiterated by other government spokesmen--that negotiations with the United States began the day after the 1903 treaty was signed. This has been a process that has been taking place for 70 years, but it is a process with various phases; all of these phases, however, are part of the same process.

Now, the signing of the agreement of principles is a part of that process, a phase. Within that phase we have reached this agreement with the United States and, understanding that it is all part of the same process, negotiations will continue immediately. There has been no resolution of continuity at this time.

Regarding an estimate for the conclusion of treaty negotiations, I tell you frankly that it is very difficult to speak of times or set dates. We believe that we have taken a good step forward in the negotiations process. Although Panama's most important objectives have been outlined in the agreement of principles, the treaty can nevertheless function by abiding by all its articles and by the precise and clear application of the goals and aspirations of our country. If these goals that have been outlined in the declaration on principles become reality tomorrow, then we will have the treaty tomorrow.

We have established that the negotiations will take place in the capitals of the two countries involved; that is, in Washington and in Panama City. However, for the next 2 months at least, negotiations will continue in Panama City before the Panamanian team moves to Washington as part of the agreement to negotiate in the two capitals. I repeat: in the two capitals, and not in any other city in the United States.

[George (Nathan), CBS news] Mr Minister, 10 years ago, President Johnson and the then President of Panama agreed to negotiate, or renegotiate, a treaty between the two countries. First, why has there been a 10-year delay in negotiating a new agreement? And basically, what is the difference between the agreement reached by the then president of Panama and Johnson and today's agreement with Kissinger?

[Tack] Your question is very important. It involves the interpretation of declarations, agreements and the general statements of policy. A declaration is formulated, an agreement on principles is reached, on which the two countries are apparently in full agreement as to the meaning of the terms of these declarations or these agreements. But it is precisely in this regard that the agreement signed today by Secretary of State Kissinger and by me, in my capacity of Panamanian foreign minister, takes on special significance.

One of the problems, one of the many that have come up in relations between Panama and the United States is the serious difficulty in reaching agreement on the exact definition of terms, concepts, or ideas which we use in our declarations or agreements on principles.

This is the problem which existed exactly 10 years ago, starting with the declaration to which you referred. In fact, this problem arose with the formal legal document that serves as a basis for these negotiations--the joint declaration which the two countries signed on 3 April 1964 under the auspices of the OAS Permanent Council.

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At certain times we have thought that we were in agreement on the meaning of the terms, but in practice, and in the development of the application of these terms, we saw that the supposed concurrence on our definitions did not really exist. A concrete example: The declaration of Presidents Johnson and Robles spoke specifically of the abrogation, the abrogation of the 1903 treaty. To us, the term abrogation of the 1903 treaty has a very clear, precise meaning, and we thought it had the same meaning for the United States. But in the course of the negotiations, we suddenly discovered that this was not the case. It was not so. We found that, on the one hand, Panama was interpreting the concept of abrogation in its precise legal-political meaning. To us abrogation means the elimination, the total disappearance from its inception of the 1903 treaty--the total and absolute disappearance, without any doubt. However, basically the United States understood abrogation to mean a revision of the 1903 treaty--that is, the kind of revision we had had in 1936, and in 1955. And Panama's very firm and very clear position is that the stage of revision ended with the 9 January 1964 events. We could never accept a simple revision of the 1903 treaty. We could not accept a situation in which the 1903 treaty would be dolled up with cosmetics to make it look better. That is not possible.

Therefore, we had to reach a clear agreement on terms, and we sincerely feel that in the agreement we have signed today both countries have a very clear idea of the exact meaning of that concept, that term. Abrogation means to both countries now that the 1903 treaty, its subsequent amendments, and all other pacts related to the interoceanic canal will be completely eliminated, and in their place a completely new treaty must be negotiated--a treaty that is truly new. We have reached agreement on this meaning. We believe that this time abrogation means the same thing to the United States as it does to Panama.

[David Binder, the New York TIMES]: Please forgive me for addressing you in English. It's my first time in a Spanish-speaking environment. You have told us of the political significance of this declaration and the beginning of negotiations between the United States and Panama on the canal and the Canal Zone. I would like to ask you what you consider to be the emotional significance of this declaration and the beginning of negotiations--what you personally feel about this event.

[Tack] When Secretary of State Kissinger and I had our first conversation in New York last October, I told him that the problem of negotiating a treaty with the United States, from Panama's point of view, could be expressed in a very simple manner, in a very concise way, and that I was sure that he, as a student of history, could understand it.

The problem for Panama does not end with the simple legal negotiation of a treaty, but rather has a very deep and fundamental objective, which is that of perfecting national independence. We believe that as long as a colonialist enclave such as the Canal Zone exists in the heart of our country, we are not truly independent. And simply, since Panama has taken the road of independence, we must be consistent with this choice. Panama did not choose to be a protectorate or a colony. And if we chose the road of independence, which was blocked by the imposition of the 1903 treaty, we must complete this process. Therefore, if we speak of emotion, since one cannot but be human in addition to being a minister, as well as a simple citizen and a Panamanian, then we are emotional about being on that road. And whoever believes that we are playing legal games, or that we are playing academic games, is quite mistaken. So this is our emotion--to be planting flags of national dignity until we have completed our independence.

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[Rafael Vargas, Radio Libertad] "I would like to ask if, in your opinion, the extensions and improvements contemplated in Point 8 of the declaration signed this afternoon will be subject to the same fixed termination date as the treaty which the two countries will negotiate.

[Tack] With regard to your question, I would like you to allow me first to give an explanation which I believe will be useful and proper at this time. What we have signed today is an agreement of basic principles, an agreement of general principles, which undoubtedly also has a specific content. However, right now there is a great distance between this agreement of basic principles and a treaty--a real treaty, a detailed treaty.

As we have said, the agreement signed today is a framework for orientation, a guide for negotiations. However, it is natural that from now on, now that the agreement of principles has been signed, we must continue the process of negotiation in a detailed and complete manner. And naturally, it is during that process that we will develop specific proposals, the positions of each country, within the framework of this agreement on basic principles.

However, I must tell you right off that the agreement cannot be examined in a conscientious, real and objective manner by taking each point separately, as a separate entity. It must be considered in its entirety. A fundamental thing for us--although there is a diversity of criteria in this respect, particularly in our academic environment--is that we must definitely eliminate the perpetuity concept and clause once and for all. And that applies to everything. But to explain more clearly, with respect to the possibilities or hypotheses about the construction of a new canal through Panama, a sea-level canal, any decision taken in this respect must be a decision determined above all by Panamanian interests. If a new, and I repeat if, a canal should be constructed on Panamanian territory, since it would be a canal which would primarily and fundamentally affect Panama, any decision in this respect must be in accordance with our national interests. Therefore, that point in the agreement of principles must be analyzed, studied, understood and evaluated from the point of view of national interests.

At this time, we are carrying out all necessary studies, all technical and political consultations on behalf of national interests to make a decision this year with regard to this problem; and in the most responsible manner to decide exactly the most convenient course in terms of national interests. Any decision taken with regard to this problem will depend on this.

[Silvio (Mendianlua), PRENSA LATINA] We would like to know, if possible, if the Panamanian Government plans to take the Panama Canal problem to the next foreign ministers meeting in Mexico?

[Tack] We are not taking this issue to the next foreign ministers meeting in Mexico, because it is already included on the agenda. The Panama Canal issue has a special place on the agenda of problems to be discussed at the meeting in Mexico. The subject is entitled "Solution of the Panama Canal Issue".

For Latin American foreign ministers this subject, which they discussed at the meeting in Bogota in November, is of common interest to all Latin American countries. It is not a subject exclusively of interest to Panama. Therefore, I repeat: The subject is included on the agenda. It is one of the eight topics to be discussed with U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger.

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[Quiros Guardia, Radio Impacto] Following the joint statements we Panamanians have many questions. I would like to ask one and, depending on the answer, ask others. In the first part of the constitution, Article III, it clearly says: National territory can never be temporarily or partially ceded, transferred or sold to another state. A number of statements were made when this was approved. However, in Point 4 of the present joint declaration the United States is being granted the right to use land, water, airspace, which is now being included, for the functioning, maintenance, protection and defense, which is now also being added, of the canal and transit of ships, also now being added. Are these points compatible with the specific prohibition in our constitution? At the same time, we have also been puzzled by the fact that, although defense has been added, no mention at all has been made of the neutralization of the Panama Canal. On the other hand, Point 7 directly refers to protection and defense of the canal. Does this mean a change in position for the Panamanian Foreign Ministry with regard to the neutralization of the canal? How can defense and neutralization coincide with foreign forces?

[Tack] This is a weighty question. I want to assure you that we have tried, that we had made the maximum effort to be very careful in the meaning of terms used in this declaration.

In the first place we must remember that as long as we continue at the negotiation level, and as long as we do not choose an alternate route to solve our basic problem, we must establish a series of criteria and concepts that will be operative as long as the U.S. presence should last or should continue in Panama in connection with the canal, as set out in the treaty. For us, esteemed Dr Quiros, the concept of the right of use is a key issue. We have used it in a very conscientious way. For us the right of use does not imply absolutely the exercise of any right that can be considered of a jurisdictional or sovereign nature. It is simply the right of use and lasts only as long as the treaty stipulates. I can assure you that there is no definite concept on the issue of the problem of neutrality or neutralization of the canal. As you know, there are academic differences regarding the two terms. But in one way or another what we understand as "canal neutrality" is important for us. And even if it is not specified in the basic principles, it is a problem which undoubtedly will have to be clearly set out in the treaty, if it is signed.

There is something else of importance which I would like you to consider. Those of us who are involved daily in the mechanics of this problem think that we are very clear as to our definition of terms. Perhaps sometimes we are not good enough teachers to see to it that the people understand it in the same way and as clearly as we do. But, assuming a possible negotiated solution, it is very clear to us how long the treaty will last, and the duration or time that it will take for Panama to recover its full, total jurisdiction over the present Canal Zone is something very different. This period, which in the agreement of principles is called the return of the Panamanian territory called the Canal Zone, must take place long before the treaty expires. Once total restitution of our jurisdiction is effected, what the United States will have for the remainder of the treaty's duration, according to our position, is the right of use, and that is all.

[Unidentified speaker, UPI] This afternoon it was reported that the Southern Command will gradually be phased out. Is this a unilateral action? Can the foreign minister tell us something about this?

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[Tack] Frankly, I can tell you that I have no official word on that press report you have just mentioned. If that were true at this moment, before we conclude a treaty, undoubtedly it would be a unilateral measure taken by the United States. Basically this would be a return to the origin of the problem, because the Southern Command--and this has been our permanent position--was not established in the Canal Zone as result of an agreement between the two countries, but was established unilaterally by the United States. If it did this unilaterally, the United States could also eliminate it.

[Indalecio Rodriguez, EL TIEMPO of Bogota]: What is the position of the Panamanian Government with regard to Colombia's rights of transit through the Panama Canal and what will these rights mean after the present negotiations?

[Tack] Since our work is teamwork, I am going to ask Carlos Lopez Guevara, one of our negotiators, to answer your question.

[Lopez Guevara] You are referring to the 1914 Thompson-Urrutia Treaty, signed between the United States and Colombia without Panama's participation. This treaty tried to establish a right of way through the Republic of Panama without Panama's consent. It is undoubtedly a treaty that was part of an international attitude which is now obsolete. It is a treaty which is neither legally nor morally binding on the Republic of Panama. The Colombian people should realize that they cannot aspire to have rights over the Republic of Panama which we have not given them. We do not see how in 1974 treaties of a colonialist nature can be imposed on the Republic of Panama.

[Ismael Peralta, CRITICA]: Mr Foreign Minister, 2 or 3 days ago a report from Washington said that among the things in a new treaty that the United States would grant to Panama would be an annuity of \$25 million instead of the \$1.9 million it presently receives. Has there been talk on a fixed sum or anything about Panama's profits from the canal?

[Tack] Up to now, we have not used the negotiations over the past 3 years to discuss sums of money. We want this to be very clear. For us, the fundamental thing at the moment is the series of political problems regarding our jurisdiction, our sovereignty over the whole of our national territory. We have always clearly told the U.S. representatives that we will never change our position on this fundamental matter simply in exchange for monetary gain.

But, it is one thing to talk about specific amounts of money, be it \$20, \$25 or \$30 million that Panama could receive as an annuity from the canal; this is something very specific, very concrete. For us, there is a broader, more legitimate matter--that is, the economic benefits which Panama is entitled to because of the construction and operation of the canal on our territory. Those economic benefits should be in relation and proportion to the capacity and right which Panama has to exploit adequately our geographical position, which is our main natural resource, for our own economic and social development. So, that principle which is included as one of the basic principles in the agreement which we have signed today specifies that Panama's geographical position is its main resource and explicitly recognizes this reality. This principle will be fulfilled by the economic benefits that we will justly derive through the exploitation of this our main natural resource. That report you mentioned, as you said, came from Washington. I do not know the source, but our position is as I have just stated. We have talked this over fully in the recent negotiations, and we believe that the United States, its top representatives in the United States, Mr Kissinger, Ambassador Bunker, understand it very well. We are not going to exchange sovereignty and jurisdiction for \$25 million a year.

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[Unidentified reporter]: My question is this: Do you know that there is strong opposition in the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives, an opposition bloc that has said it will never give a single inch to Panama in a new treaty? What do you say to this opposition?

[Tack] I will ask the Panamanian ambassador in Washington, Nicolas Gonzalez Revilla, to answer your question.

[Gonzalez Revilla] We began negotiating with the U.S. Government on the fundamental premise that the U.S. Government has the capacity to honor each clause that it negotiates with the Panamanian Government. The problem you are alluding to is a domestic problem of the U.S. Government, which we should not comment on. Just as we would hope that they would not comment on our domestic problems. This is the fundamental principle on which we have based these negotiations, which are based on the mutual respect of both countries.

[Ivan Suripa, Channel 2, Panama] Mr Minister, 2 days ago, an international news agency report from Washington discussed the principles in the agreement signed today and stating that the United States and Panama will later sign a separate agreement on exploring a second water route to handle the tremendous traffic between the Pacific and the Atlantic. Point 8 of the agreement signed today talks about the possibility that if the present canal proves insufficient, provisions will be made for new facilities. Could you please explain what a separate agreement would entail? What is this second water route that is being looked for and what type of facility could there be?

[Tack]: You must have noticed that the agreement we signed today has eight basic principles, including the one you have just pointed out. If you read the agreement of principles carefully you will note there is no mention of a separate agreement. So if there are reports coming from Washington that mention a separate agreement, they must be unofficial reports. Everything that could be called official or objective is dealt with in the eight principles we have signed and which are now public.

But a distinguished newsman has already questioned me on this same subject. Truly, this is a vitally important subject for us, for the national destiny. I want to stress that whatever the decision is--and I do not say that one specific person or that we will make it--the decision that will be made for our nation, for our country, will have to agree with what we Panamanians decide is in our own interest.

And here I would ask for real thinking on this problem, because the problem of constructing a sea-level canal or or widening the present canal is a problem that will be very apparent in the new stage of negotiations. And I think that the decisions that will be made should have a good foundation, should be made in a very aware, serious and responsible manner. Most of all, they should be above local or domestic politics because it is these decisions that can jeopardize the future, the destiny of the new generations of Panamanians.

So one has to think a lot and reflect on what is really best for us. We might come to the conclusion that it would be advantageous for Panama if the present canal, the lock canal, remains as it is. This is one alternative. Another alternative is that it would be advantageous for us if a new canal, a sea-level canal, would be constructed through Panama. And there could be other alternatives. But the problem is complex, apart from the political aspect--I repeat apart from the political aspect--of who will construct the new canal or who will widen the present one. These are political problems.

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Besides this problem there are aspects which involve our future economic and social development. We must see all this clearly within that phenomenon which we all talk about, but do not really think about. That phenomenon is our dependence--our structural, political and economic dependence. It is the problem of our national position at this point in our history. And it is not only true for Panama, but for all Latin America and all Third World nations for the next few years, because the people demand solutions, but in reality the alternatives available are few.

The alternatives for our countries, for our people, for Latin America, for Panama, for the underdeveloped nations--the nations of the Third World--could be reduced to three options: one would be dependency, to continue being dependent. It could be that some countries may like this and choose this path, wanting to be strictly dependent, economically, politically and militarily.

Another path, a second one, is that of radical revolution. This is a path that implies a high social cost, a path that some countries of the Third World have chosen. But it is a path. There is perhaps a third path, a third alternative. I believe that this path could be the effort toward autonomous development, self-development, a development of true national significance. We believe that this path is possible. It is then a matter of choosing options within the three alternatives, and this is what we want.

Do we want to be dependent? Do we want to be autonomous? Do we want to choose the radical revolutionary path? I believe that in the case of Panama, and this is just an opinion--I insist that this is an opinion, my opinion--we have started on the path toward autonomous development. I say we have started.

This goal implies a number of decisions and actions in order to reach it. Changes have to be made in our structure if this is the path that we Panamanians choose. I do not know, but I am convinced that this is the path. So what happens? This is the way we view the problem and the phenomenon of the negotiations for a new treaty.

We will never understand the negotiations themselves as something separate from our national reality. The negotiations for the treaty and the goals that we have set for ourselves are dependent on the complete understanding of the real conditions in Panama, in Latin America and in the rest of the world--above all in the underdeveloped nations. And this phenomenon is one of almost total and complete dependency.

I believe, I repeat, that we have chosen the path of national autonomy. We must focus this problem within this context. We have to see it as a process the final step of which is national liberation. That is what it is. When I speak of national liberation, I am not speaking in a political manner of permanent confrontation. I am not even speaking of hatred or bitterness. No, I speak of what we consider in the new international morality to be the right of every country to choose its own path of development.

The problem of ending the colonial situation in the Canal Zone does not necessarily imply that we are going to abolish once and for all the problem of neocolonialism. The colonial situation in the Canal Zone is one thing and the neocolonialism present in all underdeveloped countries is another. These are two steps, processes and phases. If we want to develop this via a common social consensus, then it will have to be along the path of our decision to be autonomous and to have the right to decide our own destiny ourselves.

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[Rafael Vargas, Radio Libertad]: This is actually a continuation of a question that I was going to ask, a question that has already been posed by a colleague: the question is--perhaps I am referring to something too far off yet. I do not want to be pessimistic. But if a new treaty is rejected by the top levels of government in the United States, what stand will the Panamanian Government take? The other question is: Taking into consideration the Panamanian thesis of the neutrality of the Panama Canal and that the canal cannot be defended from there, in the signing of a new treaty does Panama intend to push for the total elimination of military bases in the Canal Zone, taking into account that Point 6 refers to the protection and defense of the canal?

[Tack] I am going to ask Dr Guevara to answer your question.

[Guevara] Could you be more explicit in the last part of your question?

[Vargas] I said in the latter part of my question that considering the Panamanian thesis of the neutrality of the Panama Canal and that the canal cannot be defended from here and in view of the fact that the document that was signed today refers to the protection and defense of the canal, is Panama going to insist to the end on its demand for the total elimination of the military bases or not?

[Guevara] Point 7 contains a new principle, I would say, in the negotiations with the United States. This is the first time that the United States has accepted the participation of the Republic of Panama in the defense of the canal. Previously the United States had spoke of the unlimited responsibility and rights of the United States in the defense of the canal. They now agree that the Republic of Panama, as the most interested party as to what happens in the territory, also has a defense function, a fundamental role in the defense of the canal that is in Panamanian territory. The Panamanian participation definitely has to be a growing one, because the treaty is going to be concluded sometime. To talk about the elimination of U.S. bases is one thing and to talk about any military installation that the Republic of Panama may want to establish--with its sovereignty over that area--is another. We believe that there is no right for the existence of the present military bases in our territory. These U.S. bases must disappear someday, and the Republic of Panama will establish the bases and installations that it may sovereignly desire when it assumes the total defense of the canal.

[Vargas] My first question was a different one and perhaps the minister or Ambassador Gonzalez Revilla could answer it; the question was: In the event of a rejection of a new treaty by the political organizations of the United States, a rejection of what they call concessions, and what we call the surrender of some of our legitimate rights, if there were a rejection by the U.S. Congress, what would be the attitude of the Panamanian Government?

[Tack] This is an explanation not only for you newsmen, but also for our country and our people. I would not want this conference to have a pessimistic tone, I see no reason for it. Speaking in general terms, we are deeply committed to an effort that we consider to be for complete national development. In this sense we are very optimistic about our strength, our will and our capacity for action. We are not going to ask ourselves about the outcome. We are going to follow the course of the negotiations. Panama is showing great maturity and responsibility, and we will continue to show it. We are a civilized country. At present, we have a commitment to negotiate. We hope that these negotiations will continue to progress normally. God grant that they may reach a happy end. I have not seen any textbook where the strategies and tactics are announced publicly. Such a situation would, of course, be abnormal, but what will be done in the theoretical situation such as the one you describe will not be to make decisions based on the will of a small group of leaders or of sectors of the public. This will primarily depend on the determination or the capacity for struggle. No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/28 : LOC-HAK-205-2-11-9
basically depend on this.

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[Unidentified reporter] Mr Foreign Minister, the declaration signed today says that the Republic of Panama will participate in the administration of the canal in accordance with a procedure to be established in the treaty. It later says that at the expiration of the treaty, the canal installations will be transferred to Panamanian hands. When this occurs, will Panama have to give the United States some portion of the benefits from the canal, or will it be entirely for the Republic of Panama?

[Tack] That concept, as stated, is very clear to us. It says total responsibility to Panama, total. When the duration of a new treaty that may be signed with the United States comes to an end, when the treaty is no longer effective, from the Panamanian point of view, the exercise of all activities of the United States with regard to the canal will end. Naturally, if we are responsible, and if we are civilized as we have shown ourselves to be, and we apply principles on the basis of no discrimination clearly and objectively, as well as true principles of neutrality, undoubtedly the U.S. ships, as well as the ships of all other countries, will continue to use the canal. This is the broad objective of the Panamanian nation--that the canal serve all flags, all nations, without distinction or discrimination of any kind.

[Quiroz Guardia] You answer, Mr Minister, leaves us with a series of questions. As you aptly said, although we are reporters, we are also Panamanians. In the first place, we are concerned about the fact that in the statements made here, it seems that the 3 April treaty is being contradicted. And I am asking you about those three questions. If the 3 April agreement spoke of eliminating causes of conflict, Point 8 speaks of new installations. It is logical, therefore, that new installations could not have been a cause of conflict. If you extend the meaning of new installations, it could also mean the construction of a sea-level canal in the same area, a project which is under study.

That was the first question. The second is the matter of perpetuity. I seem to see perpetuity in the declaration. Point 6 explains that the Republic of Panama will assume total responsibility, but it says only for the functioning of the canal when the treaty expires. However, it immediately adds that the Republic of Panama will grant--in this case after the treaty expires--to the United States the necessary rights to regulate the transit of ships through the canal and operate, maintain, protect and defend the canal and to carry out any other specific activity related to these aims.

Will rights granted to the United States continue to be operative even after the treaty expires? Would you not then be speaking of perpetuity? And in the words of Secretary of State Kissinger himself, which we have been rereading after hearing you speak of use, a new treaty will have "to restore Panama's territorial sovereignty while maintaining the interests of the United States and its participation in what to us is an indispensable international waterway."

And the third question is: In view of the fact that so many questions come to mind, can we be fully guaranteed that we Panamanians will be able to discuss them completely as political groups, either supporting or dissident, and thus participate in the authentic victory of our sovereignty struggle?

[Tack] Dr Quiros, we fully understand your doubts and the questions you raise which might be bothering many Panamanians. It is by this kind of instrument--naturally, I repeat, it is an agreement of general principles and there is something I wish to say in passing, so that it may be kept in mind.

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We honestly believe that this agreement on basic, general principles is one step on the road of negotiation. Now, of course, comes the stage of negotiating the treaty itself--the detailed treaty. And we must not call it deceit. It undoubtedly will be a difficult stage. It will be a stage in which we will have to make great efforts. We will have to place all our drive, all our energy at the service of our cause in such a way, Dr Quiros, that what we think this agreement on principles contains will be specified in the treaty; that there will be no deceit.

Therefore, with all frankness, we have a common, firm and resolute objective, as established by one of the basic principles--Point 2, agreed on today, which says that the new treaty will have a fixed expiration date. We will make the effort and carry on the struggle to see that this is fully complied with, that is, that the date established for the expiration of the new treaty will be just that, fixed, and that there will be no perpetuity, neither overt, covert or disguised.

I understand that at this time any interpretation can be made, in the sense that following the treaty's expiration the United States could maintain in Panama rights or privileges with regard to the functioning or operation of the canal. But the problem is that, in accordance with our notions as to how relations between Panama and the United States will develop and as to the U.S. presence that will remain after a really just and equitable treaty is signed, upon the expiration as specified in the treaty, the U.S. presence that will or should remain will consist solely of canal administrative and operational personnel. And whatever is left to the United States in the process will be transferred to Panama, because before this everything else will have been transferred to Panama already. I believe you asked me another question?

[Quiros Guardia] Yes. By giving in to U.S. interests, by putting ourselves in their corner, we lose the battle. The causes of conflict are--and this is the first question--based on the actual status, to permit new installations to be included in the declaration is to extend the deadline we are giving them--when our position is that they cannot improve these installations unless we benefit. This is the reason we took the case to the OAS. Does it not seem to you we are giving in on a point on which we should not, one that contradicts the agreement?

[Tack] It seems to me I have already covered that point. Apparently, my explanation was not very clear. But if you read Point 8 carefully you will be able to appreciate its many aspects. In fact, we believe that in saying very cautiously that Point 2 is applicable to that question--that is, the elimination of the concept of perpetuity--we are protecting ourselves from any interpretation that perpetuity--whether, overt, covert or disguised--can be retained. On the other hand, I can assure you that we are convinced of that principle, and are trusting in the--let us call it gentlemanly--position being shown at this time by the U.S. negotiators and by the U.S. secretary of state. The United States will not be able to make any unilateral decision in this regard. This is the real situation.

In addition, speaking in a very open manner, I want to insist that we also need time--not a lengthy period--but we need time to be very sure of what will benefit Panama, with regard to a sea-level canal and new installations. For 3 years the national government has taken the precaution of making all necessary studies, all studies that are possible, so as to be very, very sure of what we should do with regard to this fundamental problem.

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With regard to your second question on the possibility for full free discussion of this topic, I believe that this moment, as we are seated here, is an excellent example of the openness with which all Panamanians affected by this problem can state their positions. This is a fact. We believe that this exchange of ideas--and note that I do not call it a discussion, because it is not a matter of discussions or argument, I would rather call it an exchange of opinion, of ideas, of criteria, or of positions--is fundamental so that we do not make mistakes. We cannot make any errors this time, because decisions must have the consensus of the great majority--of all national sectors.

After all, remember that there is a constitutional commitment and that is that any treaty that may be signed with the United States must be submitted to a plebiscite. This is a constitutional mandate which the government [words indistinct].

[Unidentified newsman] I would like to ask you if Point 8, regarding new installations, has any relation to the position which you recently said Panama would assume with regard to Point 5, on the economic benefits which Panama must demand from the operation of the canal.

[Tack] The question is very appropriate and opportune. It is exactly the case. I repeat that the decision that is made will relate primarily to our determination and ability to exploit our natural resource--our natural geographic position--for our own benefit and for the benefit of our social and economic development. Therefore, as you yourself have stated, there is a close relationship.

[Unidentified newsman] With your permission and that of my colleagues I wish to ask you this question. I understand perfectly that in a process of negotiations there are aspects considered to be secret, confidential or strategic. My question is not directed toward any strategic point, but to what I consider a possible objective of these negotiations. In the present treaty and possibly in the one under discussion, it is said that the United States has the right to have military forces for the defense of the Panama Canal. However, there is a situation which worried me as it has worried other Panamanians for many years, and that is the operation of a School of the Americas in which Latin American armed forces personnel--including Panamanian soldiers--are trained in antiguerrilla warfare, and how to defeat uprisings in various countries. I ask: Is this not a misinterpretation? How can these forces stationed to defend the canal justify sending soldiers to other countries?

[Tack] If you go over the principles we have signed today, you could see that this basically is a [training] program. I would even state that it is a program of decolonization carried out from a portion of the national territory. Since it is a [training] program, it has to be carried out as part of a process and the problem you have brought up will be considered by our country and by our government. As part of the national interest many of the Canal Zone installations, as stated in one of the principles, which will be restored as soon as possible to Panama's jurisdiction could, in the near future, be put to more effective and practical use in connection with our development. For example, I think that those establishments to which you refer would very well house an agricultural school for Latin American countries. I repeat, maybe.

[Moderator] Mr Minister, we have a telephone call from some Panamanians who work in the Canal Zone who ask if, when Panama achieves full sovereignty in the Canal Zone and participates more fully in canal affairs, would this affect the economy of the Panamanian workers in the Canal Zone?

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COSTA RICA

PRESIDENT-ELECT ODUBER TO MAINTAIN CUBAN POLICY

Paris AFP in Spanish 1525 GMT 7 Feb 74 C--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] San Jose, Costa Rica, 7 Feb--National Liberation Party candidate Daniel Oduber was officially declared the winner of the presidential elections for the 1974-1978 period on Wednesday. In May, Oduber will replace Jose Figueres, also a leader on the winning party. After the official declaration, Oduber walked down San Jose's central Avenue, greeting his supporters. As he walked the Costa Rican president-elect told AFP that he will maintain his country's position regarding Cuba; that is, that Costa Rica will not renew diplomatic relations with Cuba as long as the Cuban Government persists on its present policy.

According to Oduber, Cuba has hundreds of political prisoners and is supporting subversion in Latin America. Furthermore, he said he favors a meeting of the Central American presidents with the specific purpose of considering the Honduran-Salvadoran controversy. These two countries broke off diplomatic relations in July 1969 and waged a short war.

Calls for Unity

Hamburg DPA in Spanish 0214 GMT 7 Feb 74 C--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] San Jose, 6 Feb--In his first news conference, Costa Rican President-Elect Daniel Oduber announced a new concept for Costa Rican money based on its social worth for improving the lot of the most needy workers. He said that the currency will be known as the "social colon." Oduber also mentioned that he will visit all the Central American countries in the next few days before leaving for Venezuela where a Central American consensus on the oil problems will be discussed.

The president-elect asked all Costa Ricans to unite in the struggle for the improvement of the most needy in what he called "the struggle against poverty." Oduber said that relations with the United States as well as with the Soviet Union will remain cordial, regardless of the political system in operation.

Oduber declared: "My government will find its strength in its ideas and its programs." He added that all military ranks will be abolished in May when he becomes president. He explained that Costa Rica has 3,000 policemen for safety's sake. He also criticized the meetings of the Central American military men, by saying: "I do not believe in them." Oduber was elected president of Costa Rica last Sunday. He will replace Jose Figueres, beginning a 4-year term in May.

NICARAGUA

SANDISTA LIBERATION FRONT RENEWS ACTIVITIES

Paris AFP in Spanish 0240 GMT 6 Feb 74 C--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Managua, 5 Feb--The newspaper NOVEDADES, spokesman for the government, today reported that the outlawed Sandinista National Liberation Front has renewed its terrorist activities in northern Nicaragua. According to the newspaper, peasant leader Catalino Flores, 35 years old, was identified as the main activist of the front, whose members attacked a rancher last week and stole \$8,000 from him. NOVEDADES adds that in 1972 Catalino Flores finished serving a 5-year sentence for communist proselytizing activities. The newspaper states that 24 military patrols are trying to surround Flores and his group in the mountains of the north, near Jinotega.

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That situation has changed completely since Dr Kissinger took over the State Department. President Nixon has placed full confidence in the intelligence, skill and patriotism of his distinguished adviser, whom he has given freedom to make major decisions within the broad directives set down by the chief executive, and the Pentagon people have come to realize there is now an extraordinarily competent secretary of state who knows well what he does, how he does it and why he does it, and that there is no need for them to meddle in such affairs.

Convinced that the United States faced a series of international problems of tremendous magnitude, Dr Kissinger moved into action rapidly. His trip to China, which was followed by President Nixon's own visit; the Paris agreements that enabled the United States to come out decorously from the Vietnam mess; detente with the Soviet Union and, more recently, bringing Arabs and Israelis together towards a solution of the grave Middle East conflict, are the most sensational achievements of this illustrious professor who now turns his attention to Panama in order to settle a 70-year-old controversy.

We believe we are right in saying this is the first time that an American secretary of state has clearly grasped Panama's case and that, for the first time too, Washington has realized the need to remedy as quickly as possible a situation that brings shame upon the international prestige of the United States regardless of how forceful Panama's arguments have been, they would have come to naught once more against the traditional lack of understanding and obstinate intransigence which has been our long experience, had not Dr Kissinger brought to the State Department his capacity to grasp clearly the realities of the world today.

The arrival of Dr Kissinger in Panama today is of singular importance in the history of the very special relationship of our country with the United States, for he has come expressly to sign a basic document that should--at least--clear the way for an instrument that will put the seal of satisfaction on our dearest aspirations.

SECRETARY KISSINGER DEPARTS PANAMA FOR U.S.

[Editorial Report C] Panama City Radio Libertad in Spanish at 2230 GMT on 7 February 1974 reports that Secretary of State Kissinger departed at 1745 for the United States aboard the special plane which brought him to Panama. The announcer says that during a short interview with Lt Colonel Noriega Kissinger expressed his satisfaction with the manner in which the activities of his visit proceeded. The announcer goes on to say that General Torrijos, Lt Col Noriega, Lt Col Manuel Jose Arauz and U.S. Ambassador Sayre were at the airport to bid farewell to Kissinger.

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[Tack] In answer to our compatriots who work in the so-called Canal Zone, our position definitely could never be to injure the interests of an important sector of our population. Such an attitude is by no means considered in our objective. We realize and are very conscientious of their concern and since they have shown it by participating in this talk with the people, we want them to be sure that no country which recovers its dignity is going to harm any of its national sectors.

[Jacinto Fuentes, PANAMA AMERICAN] Since the first Roosevelt who appeared on the U.S. political scene made the arrogant and stupid statement in San Francisco that he had taken Panama, the idea has existed in the minds of the people in the United States that our republic is actually a part [of the United States] or that for some reason they have some right over our country. You have just said that the struggle we are undertaking is going to be difficult, and we are all concerned over the fate of the treaty which will be negotiated based on the principles signed today. I would like to ask if the government has considered the possibility of changing the attitude or the idea that the American people have in regard to those rights they pretend to have over part of our territory so that we can change that belief in favor of the final treaty to be negotiated?

[Tack] Yes. You have mentioned a difficult and complex problem, to penetrate the conscience of the American people. We have made an effort within the limitations available to us. You will recall the UN Security Council session last year in this city. This was part of our effort to penetrate the conscience of the American people. This is important. It is not an easy task, but we believe it has its importance, its significance, and we will do everything possible to continue this work within our means.

But I would prefer if that type question and worry did not take our attention away from something I feel is more important than attempting to penetrate the American people's conscience. More important for us is our internal strength. This strength and this capability will determine the success of our efforts.

[Moderator] One moment please. Here is an interesting question from a television viewer. I think we must also allow the people who are listening and viewing this program to participate. He asks: Do you think that because Secretary of State Kissinger has come to Panama, this means the United States is seriously seeking to find acceptable solutions to the problem created by Panama's demand for an annulment of the 1903 treaty?

[Tack] This question is well presented. I will answer it in the same direct, clear manner. I think that the presence of Secretary of State Kissinger in Panama today is definite proof that he is going to make the most serious efforts he can to find a just and equitable solution to our conflict.

[Moderator] A last question now. I believe we have gone beyond the time stipulated.

[Vargas, Radio Libertad] Besides the implementation of a so-called new dialog policy, to what do you attribute the change of attitude of the U.S. Government on continuing negotiations with Panama?

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I also think that the international solidarity which Panama has obtained in recent years has also played an important role. This reached its height in 1973 in the document approved by all Latin American foreign ministers in Bogota, which is going to be part of the agenda of what is now called the new dialog policy with Secretary Kissinger. What you mentioned, I believe, is exactly what should make us think about our future. This is not the time for pessimistic or optimistic attitudes.

I do not think this is a matter of either of the two extremes. We trust, we trust or hope, that this new type of mentality to which you are referring will be effectively tested in the Panamanian case. We hope so, we hope so. Being Latin Americans we hope that the Panamanian problem will find a just and equitable solution and that in the process we will be able to open paths of dignity and liberation for our brother countries. Our struggle, our demands are not selfish ones; they could never be. They are not selfish; our government is not selfish as a nation, no less could it be selfish toward our brother countries of Latin America, of the continent, of the Third World, of the underdeveloped countries.

We firmly believe that the canal should definitely be a civic work, a work of peace that will join men of all countries, of all continents, and should never cause divisions due to political, economic or social reasons, and much less, military reasons. That is our aspiration. It might seem a very abstract or idealist aspiration, but we believe such is the course of history. We are sure the next generation of Panamanians will see the results brought about by the internal strength and unity we will show. That is the path of our liberation. Thank you.

STAR AND HERALD WELCOMES KISSINGER VISIT

Panama City STAR AND HERALD in English 7 Feb 74 C

[Editorial: "Welcome, Dr Kissinger"]

[Text] So much has been written everywhere on Dr Henry A. Kissinger, the incumbent secretary of state of the United States, that it becomes difficult even to extend him a cordial welcome without risking repeating some or much of what others have said previously. But even at such a risk, it is just and necessary to say that Dr Kissinger has shown, through positive action and outstanding successes in the field of diplomacy, that he is not disposed to let his name merely appear in the long and anodine list of U.S. secretaries of state, many of whom are remembered only for their sorry lack of understanding.

The people of the United States are, or should be, among the best informed in the world, judging from the number and quality of communications media at their disposal. Yet those responsible for conducting the nation's foreign policy, despite the large number of diplomatic missions abroad and their complementary services, frequently gave the impression of being unaware of what was going on in the world or else not understanding a word of what was communicated to them.

Some years ago, when we commented on the tragic events of 9 January, we remarked in an editorial entitled "The Three-Headed Eagle" that it was impossible to expect a skilled foreign policy on the part of the U.S. Government when the important decisions had to be taken by the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department, since such a situation led to inevitable confusion, delays, hindrances and, of course, mistakes.